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The influence of recollection and familiarity in the
formation and updating of associative representations
Jason D. Ozubko,1 Morris Moscovitch,2 and Gordon Winocur2
1Department of Psychology, SUNY Geneseo, Geneseo, New York 14454, USA; 2Rotman Research Institute, Baycrest Centre,
Toronto, Ontario M6A 2E1, Canada
Prior representations affect future learning. Little is known, however, about the effects of recollective or familiarity-based
representations on such learning. We investigate the ability to reuse or reassociate elements from recollection- and famil-
iarity-based associations to form new associations. Past neuropsychological research suggests that hippocampal, and
presumably recollective, representations are more flexible than extra-hippocampal, presumably familiarity-based, represen-
tations. We therefore hypothesize that the elements of recollective associations, as opposed to familiarity-based represen-
tations, may be more easily manipulated and decoupled from each other, and facilitate the formation of new associations.
To investigate this hypothesis we used the AB/AC learning paradigm. Across two recall studies we observed an advantage in
learning AC word pairs if AB word pairs were initially recollected. Furthermore, AB word pairs were more likely to intrude
during a final AC test if those AB word pairs were initially familiarity-based. A third experiment using a recognition version
of the AB/AC paradigm ruled out the possibility that our findings were due to memory strength. Our results support the
idea that elements in recollective associative traces may be more discretely coded, leading to their flexible use, whereas
elements in familiarity-based associative traces are less flexible.
Dual-process accounts of episodic memory posit that episodic
memory can be divided into two qualitatively distinct forms: rec-
ollection and familiarity (Mandler 1980; Tulving 1985; Gardiner
1988; Jacoby 1991).Whereas familiarity is characterized as simply
having a sense of knowing or acquaintance with stimuli that were
experienced, recollection is considered a flexible formof represen-
tation that is linked to the context in which the stimuli were pre-
sented and enables the individual to relive the past experience
associated with the stimuli (see Yonelinas 2002 for a review).
Though not a direct relation, researchers have demonstrated
that recollection is often supported by the hippocampus whereas
familiarity is not (Cohen and Eichenbaum 1993; Eichenbaum
et al. 2007; Schacter et al. 2012; seeWixted and Squire 2011 for al-
ternative views about the nature of hippocampal representations).
Neuropsychological evidence also suggests that hippocam-
pal representations are more flexible than representations that
rely on extra-hippocampal structures, such as the peri-rhinal
and parahippocampal cortices (Cohen and Eichenbaum 1993;
Eichenbaum et al. 2007; Schacter et al. 2012). There is also con-
siderable evidence that the flexible use of learned, relational
associations depends on the hippocampus (Myers et al. 2003;
Eichenbaum et al. 2007; van der Jeugd et al. 2009; see Olsen
et al. 2012; see Zeithamova et al. 2012, for reviews). For example,
in one fMRI study, Preston et al. (2004) demonstrated that
although the posterior hippocampus was activated in response
to the retrieval of learned associations, the anterior hippocampus
was activated bilaterally when participants were asked to make
judgments that required inferences across learned associations
(see also Heckers et al. 2004; Zalesak and Heckers 2009).
Likewise, Shohamy and Wagner (2009) found that successful
generalization from overlapping learned associations to new
ones, depends on hippocampal processes involved in integrating
the information from learned associations at encoding. Indeed,
such findings are pervasive in animal, as well as human, hippo-
campal research. In one study it was found that although hippo-
campally damaged rats learned to make odor discriminations
between pairs of odors, they were unable to continue to perform
the task if the learned odors were rearranged to form novel pairs,
supporting the view that the hippocampus is involved with the
flexible reorganization of memories based on task demands
(Eichenbaum et al. 1989). More recently, researchers have argued
that the hippocampus plays a key role in the flexible use of rela-
tional information across a number of cognitive and social tasks,
including areas as diverse as navigation, exploration, imagina-
tion, creativity, character judgments, empathy, social discourse,
and language (see Rubin et al. 2014 for review).
Thus, a wide range of research, findings suggest that re-
collective (or hippocampally dependent representations) are
more flexible than familiarity-based representations. Although
there have been extensive investigations of the characteristics of
recollection-based and familiarity-based representations, and
the factors that promote their encoding and retrieval, less work
has been devoted to exploring the influence that these two types
of memory representations have on later learning (though see
Schacter et al. 2012). Understanding how memories, whether
they are recollection- or familiarity-based, can support the forma-
tion of novel yet overlapping representations may provide impor-
tant new insights into the nature of memory representation, and
the varied roles that these two types of memory play in other
domains (e.g., decision-making and problem solving; Myers
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et al. 2003; Eichenbaum et al. 2007; van der Jeugd et al. 2009;
Olsen et al. 2012; Zeithamova et al. 2012; Moscovitch et al. 2016).
We begin with a discussion of neuropsychological patient
work regarding the flexibility of hippocampal-based representa-
tions during relearning. Though recollective representations are
thought to be hippocampal in nature, even advocates of this
view would not argue that recollection is wholly dependent
on hippocampal function (Cohen and Eichenbaum 1993;
Eichenbaum et al. 2007; Schacter et al. 2012). By examining past
neuropsychological findings to develop our hypothesis regarding
recollection and relearning, we aim to validate and extend
existing neuropsychological accounts of hippocampal function
and recollection, while grounding our hypotheses about recollec-
tion and familiarity in neuropsychological models of memory
representation. The novel hypothesis that we examined is
whether the elements of recollective associations, as opposed to
familiarity-based representations, are more easily manipulated
and decoupled from each other, and facilitate the formation
of new associations in neurologically intact individuals. This
hypothesis is consistent with cognitive models of recollection,
which espouse the idea that recollection-based representations
are relational in nature, in that they incorporate both the ele-
ments of an experience and their associations to one another
(Cohen and Eichenbaum 1993; O’Reilly and Rudy 2001; Olsen
et al. 2012). In essence, we ask whether recollective representa-
tions are indeed “flexible,” as one would predict if they were
hippocampally supported, and investigate the consequences of
having such representations for learning novel, yet related, and
potentially interfering, material.
On the flexibility of hippocampal and recollective
representations
Traditionally, the effects of prior memory on subsequent learning
have been studied by examining transfer or interference effects
from one memory to another. One widely used procedure is
AB–AC learning, in which one examines the effects of learning
to associate A with B on learning to form a new association of
A with C (where A, B, and C are often words). Although there is
an extensive literature on this topic (Underwood 1949; Postman
1962), and researchers have used related paradigms to show
that recollective representations are resistant to interference
(e.g., Jones and Atchley 2006), no studies, to our knowledge,
have directly examined the effects of recollection and familiarity-
based associations on learning subsequent associations.
Regarding hippocampal representations specifically, sever-
al studies examining individuals with hippocampal damage
(i.e., amnesic patients), using an AB/AC recall paradigm, have
documented that the hippocampus is important for reducing
interference between previously learned information and novel
information (Winocur and Weiskrantz 1976; Winocur and
Kinsbourne 1978; Kinsbourne and Winocur 1980; Winocur et al.
1996). For example, Winocur et al. (1996) demonstrated that
patients with left-sided medial temporal lobe (MTL) lesions (in-
cluding the hippocampus) had difficulty learning AC word pairs
after learning AB word pairs, and demonstrated more AB word
intrusions during the AC test than did controls or patients
with right-sided (i.e., nonverbal hemispheric) lesions. Further,
Winocur et al. (1996) demonstrated that similar difficulties in
learning AC word pairs were observed in healthy young and old
controls when those participants engaged in an implicit memory
test, which is not mediated by the hippocampus. Presuming that
recollective representations are dependent on the hippocampus
(or at least more so than are familiarity-based representations),
in these studies patients may have relied more on familiarity
thanon recollection (Yonelinas 2002), suggesting that familiarity-
basedmemory is indeedmore rigid and less flexible than recollec-
tion (for similar results see also Winocur and Weiskrantz 1976;
Winocur and Kinsbourne 1978; Kinsbourne and Winocur 1980;
and see Winocur and Moscovitch 1983 for similar results from
older participants).
Consistent with the findings of Winocur et al. (1996), Hay
et al. (2002) used process-dissociation procedure (PDP), adapted
from Hay and Jacoby (1996), to determine whether the interfer-
ence resulted from impaired controlled processes (which are often
related to recollection-based processes) or automatic processes
(which are sometimes related to familiarity-based processes) in
patients with MTL lesions. As expected, controlled processes
were shown to be impaired, and resulted in greater AB intrusions
during the AC test, suggesting that familiarity-based memories
may interfere with subsequent learning. If controlled processes
are taken as an approximate measure of hippocampal and recol-
lective influences, and automatic processes are taken to reflect
extra-hippocampal familiarity-based influences, then these re-
sults too are consistent with the idea that recollective representa-
tions may be more flexible than familiarity-based representations
in terms of forming new associations.
Though patient studies by both Winocur et al. (1996) and
Hay et al. (2002) converge on the idea that hippocampal, and
thus recollective representations, are more flexible when it comes
to later learning, these studies are at best only suggestive. Namely,
were recollection or familiarity were not specifically measured in
any of these studies, meaning that we must speculate to some
degree about what these studies tell us about recollection and
familiarity. Research supports the idea that recollection is often
hippocampally supported whereas familiarity is not, but as al-
readymentioned, there is some disagreement as to howmuch rec-
ollection is a reflection of hippocampal representation (Wixted
and Squire 2011). As well, none of these studies used a baseline
condition in which no prior learning occurred. Hence, even if
our interpretations regarding recollection and familiarity and
hippocampal function are completely accurate, it is unclear
whether recollection could have facilitated subsequent learning
or merely not interfered with it. Finally, neither of these studies
ruled out the possibility that memory strength, rather than recol-
lection versus familiarity, was the critical factor that influenced
later learning. Some researchers have pointed out that in many
conditions recollections tend to be high-confidence responses
whereas familiarity-based responses, on average, tend to be less
confident (Donaldson 1996; Wixted and Stretch 2004; Wais
et al. 2010). Because of this memory strength difference, it is pos-
sible that rather than reflecting differences between recollection
and familiarity, past studies are truly reflecting a difference that
is being driven by memory strength. Therefore, past patient work
supports the idea that recollections may be more flexible than
familiarity-based representations, but several important questions
remain. In the present study, we will address these issues.
Current study
The present study used the AB–AC paradigm to test directly the
hypothesis that recollection-based memories support, and possi-
bly facilitate, the acquisition of related, yet novel, information
better than familiarity-based memories. Importantly, this effect
could be shown either as an increase in recall and recognition
rates for the related material, a decrease in intrusions and false
alarms to the originally learned material when testing the related
material, or both. In the following experiments, participants first
learned a series of AB word pairs (e.g., FIRE–DOG). Subsequently,
they learned a series of AC word pairs in which the first word
from each pair was shared with a corresponding AB word pair
(e.g., FIRE–TREE). By noting which AB word pairs were rated as
Flexibility of recollection and familiarity
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recollected versus familiar, we could predict which AC word pairs
would be easier to learn. Specifically, based on our hypothesis, the
ACword pairs that correspond to recollected ABword pairs should
be learned more easily, show less interference than AC word pairs
that correspond to nonrecollected (i.e., familiar) ABword pairs, or
both. Experiments 1 and 2 address the influence of recollection
and familiarity on relearning using AB/AC recall paradigms. In
Experiment 3, we adopt a recognition version of the AB/AC para-
digm, so as to directly examine the potential role of memory
strength in any observed effects.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 investigated the ability of healthy young adults to
learn new AC associations after having acquired AB associations
that were either recollected or familiar. Though an extensive liter-
ature on the AB–AC paradigm exists (Underwood 1949; Postman
1962; Jones and Atchley 2006), no one has examined whether AC
learning is influenced by whether the prior AB associations are
recollection-based or familiarity-based. Thus, we combined the
cued recall test of the typical AB/AC recall paradigmwith remem-
ber/know (R/K) style judgments (Tulving 1985) to gauge recollec-
tion and familiarity, respectively. Despite concerns as to whether
R/K judgments provide proper estimates of recollection and famil-
iarity (e.g., Donaldson 1996; Hirshman and Master 1997; Inoue
and Bellezza 1998; Wixted and Stretch 2004; Wixted 2007;
Rotello and Zeng 2008), research suggests that they do reflect a
qualitative distinction between memories, (e.g., Rajaram 1993;
Perfect and Dasgupta 1997; Yonelinas 2002; Eichenbaum et al.
2007; Skinner and Fernandes 2007) that converges with indepen-
dent measures of recollection and familiarity when instructions
on how to make R/K responses are strict (see Yonelinas et al.
1996; Yonelinas 2001; Rotello et al. 2005). Consequently, in all
our experiments, strict and detailed instructions were given to
ensure that obtained judgments would be reasonable indicators
of the presence of recollection and familiarity (see Yonelinas
et al. 1996; Yonelinas 2001; Rotello et al. 2005). In Experiment
3, we directly investigate the issue of memory strength as a poten-
tial confound.
In terms of combining recall with R/K judgments, few re-
searchers have directly examined the issue of familiarity in cued
recall, although there is some evidence that familiarity can
contribute even to free recall (Mickes et al. 2013; Sadeh et al.
2015). Several studies have shown that stem and word cues can
be effectively completed without conscious recall strategies
(Schacter andMcGlynn 1989; Hay and Jacoby 1996), even by am-
nesic patients with severe recollective deficits (Verfaellie et al.
2005). Consistent with this, the few studies that directly investi-
gated recollection and familiarity in cued recall provide evidence
of nonrecollective, familiarity-based retrieval (Lindsay and Kelley
1996; Brainerd and Reyna 2010). The broader implication here is
that if familiarity is interpreted as a general process that reflects
ease or fluency with which information is generated and per-
ceived (e.g., Jacoby et al. 1989), then it seems reasonable to
assume that familiarity can support recall in forced-response,
cued recall paradigms (as in the present experiments). To reinforce
this claim, Experiment 3 will use a recognition paradigm to verify
the recall findings regarding familiarity in Experiment 1 and 2.3
In Experiment 1, participants learned a list of AB word pairs.
They then were given A-items as cues and recalled B-items, for
which they also provided ratings of recollection and familiarity.
Performance on this test served as our baseline condition. Next,
participants studied a list of AC word pairs. The A-items in this
list were the same as those in the AB study list. Learning the asso-
ciation between AC items, therefore, represents learning that
requires participants to use the A-word element from the original
AB association to form the new AC association. Finally, a second
cued recall test was given in which participants once again were
presented with A-words as cues but this time were asked to recall
only the C-words.
Based on our earlier discussion of neuropsychological find-
ings, we expected that AC word pairs that correspond to recollect-
ed AB word pairs would be the easiest to learn, even surpassing
initial baseline learning levels. Thus, participants should show
higher C-item recall rates, lower B-item intrusion rates, or both
for corresponding recollection-based AB pairs than familiarity-
based AB pairs.
Results and discussion
In terms of verifying the methods of Experiment 1, a hallmark
of recollection-based responding is that it is more accurate
than familiarity-based responding, with fewer memory errors
(Yonelinas 2002). The mean accuracy of B-item recall for recol-
lected responses was near ceiling (M ¼ 0.92, SE ¼ 0.01) and sig-
nificantly greater than the mean accuracy of B-item recall for
familiar responses (M ¼ 0.56, SE ¼ 0.05), t(34) ¼ 7.10, P, 0.01,
d ¼ 2.43.
Correct recall rates were calculated separately for the AB Test
and AC Test. Correct recall rates in the AB Test represent the
probability of a participant recalling (i.e., producing a studied
word and identifying it as recollected or familiar) the appropriate
B-word to a given A-word cue, and in the AC Test, represent the
probability of a participant recalling the appropriate C-word to a
given A-word cue.
Critical intrusion rates in the AB Test were calculated as the
proportion of C-words produced during the AB Test. Because
C-words were never exposed to participants during or before the
ABTest, there should be a very lowprobability of these items being
produced. However, the critical intrusion rate in the AB Test
should provide a reasonable estimate of the likelihood a partici-
pant would produce a critical intrusion purely by chance (i.e.,
with no influence of memory).
To determine the critical intrusion rate in the AC Test, we
calculated the proportion of trials during the AC Test in which
participants recalled either the same word as they did in AB
Test, or the B-word whichwas studied in the AB Test. For example,
imagine a participant had studied FROG-GREEN during the AB
study phase and during the AB Test they recalled SWAMP.
During the ACTest, eitherGREENor SWAMPwould be considered
a critical intrusion in response to FROG. Because participants were
forced to produce a word on each trial, responses that were iden-
tified as guesses were not considered to be intrusions. In all cases
then, intrusionswere counted onlywhen a participant produced a
recollection or familiarity response.
Figure 1A plots the probability of recall and intrusion during
the AB and AC Test, respectively. The results of the AB Test are
further divided to illustrate the proportion of recollection and fa-
miliarity responses given during the AB Test. Significantly more
recollection responses were produced than familiarity responses
during the AB Test, t(34) ¼ 4.13, P, 0.01, d ¼ 1.42. In terms of
recall and intrusion rates, more studied items were recalled in
the AB Test than in the AC Test, t(34) ¼ 3.56, P, 0.01, d ¼ 1.22
and more critical intrusions were produced in the AC Test than
in the AB Test, t(34) ¼ 6.65, P, 0.01, d ¼ 2.28. Hence, memory
was better during the AB Test, likely because the AC Test suffered
3Although we argue that the concept of familiarity translates readily from rec-
ognition to cued recall designs, it is less clear how one would interpret
“familiarity”-based responses in free recall. For a discussion of this issue and
one interpretation, see Mickes, Seale-Carlisle, and Wixted (2013).
Flexibility of recollection and familiarity
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proactive interference from AB learning. However, the important
question here is whether the proportion of recalls or critical
intrusions during the AC Test depended on whether the corre-
sponding AB items were recollected (AC|R) or familiar (AC|F)
during the AB Test.
Recalls and critical intrusions during the AC Test, condition-
alized on whether the corresponding AB items were recollected or
familiar, are shown in Figure 1B. As predicted, there were more re-
calls for AC|R versus AC|F items, t(34) ¼ 4.94, P, 0.01, d ¼ 1.69,
and there were marginally more critical intrusions for the AC|F
versus the AC|R items, t(34) ¼ 2.03, P ¼ 0.05, d ¼ 0.70. In fact, us-
ing the AB Test as a baseline, the AC|R recall rates were enhanced
above baseline, t(34) ¼ 5.35, P, 0.01, d ¼ 1.84, whereas the AC|F
recall rates were not, t(34) ¼ 1.45, P ¼ 0.16, d ¼ 0.50. Both the
AC|R andAC|F conditions, however, producedmore critical intru-
sions than baseline, with both t’s . 5.54, P, 0.01, d ¼ 1.90.
In sum, it was easier for participants to learn and recall AC
items when the corresponding AB items had been recollected, as
opposed to when the corresponding AB items had been familiar.
Moreover, at least for recall rates, this was not merely a relative
difference but a true enhancement above baseline for the AC|R
condition.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, participants’ memory for the AB word pairs was
tested before AC learning. One limitation of this approach is that
testing itself can act as an encoding event (Roediger and Karpicke
2006). Thus, even if an AB pair is initially only familiar to partic-
ipants and reported as such during the AB test, the AB items may
be reencoded on this test trial as a recollected pair. At least some of
the AB items that were classified as familiar may actually have
been converted to recollected by the time the AC test occurred.
In fact if this were the case, Experiment 1 would have “underesti-
mated” the difference between AC|R and AC|F items, making it a
conservative test of our hypothesis. Nonetheless, we conducted
Experiment 2, using a modification of the present paradigm
which circumvents this issue.
Experiment 2was similar to Experiment 1 except that instead
of AB items being tested before the AC study and test phases, AB
items were tested after each AC item was tested, making
Experiment 2 a version of modified-modified free recall (MMFR)
(Barnes and Underwood 1959). Thus, in Experiment 2, there
were only three phases: AB Study, AC Study, and Test. On each
test trial, participants were given anA-word cue and asked to recall
the corresponding C-word. Immediately
afterward, they were asked to recall the
corresponding B-word and then to indi-
cate a rating of recollection, familiarity,
or guess for that B-word. In this way, we
still obtained recollection/familiarity
ratings for AB items in Experiment 2,
but not until AC items had been tested,
thereby eliminating any potential for
AB testing to alter the nature of the AB
memory, and resulting in more precise
recollection and familiarity ratings.
Results and discussion
In terms of verifying the methods of
Experiment 2, the mean accuracy of
B-item recall for recollected responses
was high (M ¼ 0.81, SE ¼ 0.03) and sig-
nificantly greater than the mean accura-
cy of B-item recall for familiar responses (M ¼ 0.44, SE ¼ 0.04),
t(29) ¼ 8.95, P, 0.01, d ¼ 3.32.
Recalls and intrusions were calculated in the same way as
Experiment 1. Namely, recalls occurred when participants pro-
duced a B-item during the AB portion of the test or a C-item dur-
ing the AC portion of the test and identified that item as
recollected or familiar. Critical intrusions occurred when partici-
pants produced a C-item during the AB portion of the test or a
B-item during the AC portion of the test and identified that
item as recollected or familiar.
Figure 2A plots the probability of recall and critical intrusion
during the AB and AC portion of the test respectively. The AB re-
call and intrusions are further divided to illustrate the proportion
of recollection and familiarity responses given to these items.
Significantly more recollection responses were produced than
familiar responses for AB items, t(29) ¼ 3.16, P, 0.01, d ¼ 1.17.
In terms of recall and critical intrusion rates, more studied
items were recalled in the AB Test than in the AC Test, t(29) ¼
6.68, P, 0.01, d ¼ 2.48, and more critical intrusions were pro-
duced in the AC Test than in the AB Test, t(29) ¼ 5.14, P, 0.01,
d ¼ 1.91. Memory, therefore, was better for the AB items com-
pared with the AC items, likely due to proactive interference
during the AC learning from the AB items. Once again, however,
the critical question here is whether the proportion of recalls
or critical intrusions during the AC Test depended on whether
the corresponding AB items were recollected (AC|R) or familiar
(AC|F) during the AB Test.
Recalls and critical intrusions during the AC Test, condition-
alized on whether the corresponding AB items were recollected
or familiar, are shown in Figure 2B. ReplicatingExperiment 1, there
weremore recalls for AC|R versus AC|F items, t(29) ¼ 4.90, P, 0.01,
d ¼ 1.82, and there were more critical intrusions for the AC|F
versus the AC|R items, t(29) ¼ 3.29, P, 0.01, d ¼ 1.22. Once again,
using the AB Test as a baseline, the AC|R recall rates were enhanced
above baseline, t(29)¼ 5.28, P, 0.01, d ¼ 1.96, whereas the AC|F
recall rates were not, t(29) ¼ 0.33, P ¼ 0.74, d ¼ 0.12. Both the
AC|R and AC|F conditions, however, produced more critical intru-
sions than baseline, with both t’s. 3.23, P, 0.01, d. 1.20.
The results of Experiment 2 confirm and extend those of
Experiment 1. AC learning was facilitated above baseline when
AB items were recollected but not when AB items were familiar,
whereas the opposite was the case for critical intrusions.
Importantly, because the results of Experiment 2 were so similar
to those of Experiment1, we can have confidence in the reliability
of these findings despite the different procedures used in these
two experiments.
Figure 1. (A) Mean proportion of old items and critical lures recalled (i.e., produced and identified as
recollected or familiar) during the AB Test and AC Test in Experiment 1. Results of the AB Test are further
divided to illustrate the proportion of recollection [p(R)] and familiarity [p(K)] responses. (B) Mean pro-
portion of old items and critical lures recalled during the AC Test conditionalized by whether the cor-
responding AB item was recollected (AC|R) or familiar (AC|F) during the AB Test. In both panels, old
items indicate AB pairs in the AB Test and AC pairs in the AC Test, whereas critical lures indicate AC
pairs in the AB Test and AB pairs in the AC Test. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
Flexibility of recollection and familiarity
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Experiment 3
Thus far, we have taken a traditional dual-process approach to the
interpretation of recollection and familiarity, presuming that
these two measures reflect a qualitative difference in memory
representation (see Yonelinas 2002). Single-process accounts offer
an alternative view of recollection and familiarity, however, sug-
gesting that the measures do not differ in kind but rather merely
in strength (Donaldson 1996; Wixted and Stretch 2004; Wais
et al. 2010). From this account, Experiments 1 and 2 could be
interpreted as supporting the notion that strongmemories reduce
interference in AB–AC learning, whereas weaker memories do
not. Though we have argued in favor of a dual-process view of
recollection and familiarity, the single-process account deserves
consideration. Indeed, even if recollection and familiarity are
taken to reflect a qualitative distinction in memory, researchers
have pointed out that strength is often confounded with recollec-
tion and familiarity, such that recollection often represents strong
memory, and familiarity represents a range of memory strength,
making familiarity, on average, weaker (Wixted and Mickes
2010). Such a model could be termed a “graded dual-process ac-
count,” and this model too suggests that memory strength serves
as an alternative explanation for the data we have observed thus
far. Hence, regardless of one’s theoretical perspective on dual- ver-
sus single-process accounts, it is important to control for strength
between recollection and familiarity-based responses when draw-
ing conclusions about differences observed between them.
In Experiment 3, we directly address the issue of memory
strength by gathering confidence ratings as a proxy for memory
strength. In doing so, we can investigate the influence of strength,
and specifically examine whether the strength of representations
could explain the effects we observed in Experiments 1 and 2 be-
tween recollection and familiarity. If strength plays an important
role, then it should determine the pattern of results irrespective
of whether the items are recollected or familiar. If strength does
not play a primary role, then the recollection and familiarity
distinction should determine our results, independent of confi-
dence ratings. Additionally, by equating the confidence between
recollected and familiar responses, we can rule out the possibility
that our findings are somehow due to item effects, wherein some
A items are simply highly memorable and associable. If item
effects are driving the findings from Experiments 1 and 2, then
high confidence recollected and familiar items should show iden-
tical data patterns in Experiment 3.
To examine memory strength,
Experiment 3 was designed as an AB–
AC recognition task instead of a recall
task, and to obtain reliable measures of
confidence we included more study and
test items than would be feasible in re-
call. These changes not only offered the
opportunity to examine the potential
role of memory strength in mediating
our effects, but also a chance to extend
the findings of Experiment 1 and 2 to
recognition. It remains possible that
the effects we have reported thus far
are somehow artifacts of cued recall
itself. This possibility is ruled out if
Experiment 3 succeeds in replicating
the findings of Experiments 1 and
2. Hence, Experiment 3 serves not only
to address the issue of memory strength
and item effects, but as a demonstration
of the robustness of our findings.
Results and discussion
To verify the recollection/familiarity judgments in the AB Test of
Experiment 3, we examined themean accuracy of these responses.
For example, the accuracy of recollection responses was calculated
as the probability of a recollection and “old” (confidence rating
of 4, 5, or 6) response for an AB item compared with an AB′ or
an AD item. Similarly, the accuracy of familiarity responses was
calculated as the probability of a familiar and “old” (confidence
rating of 4, 5, or 6) response for an AB item compared with an
AB′ or an AD item. The mean accuracy of recollection responses
(M ¼ 0.91, SE ¼ 0.02) was significantly greater than the mean
accuracy of familiar response (M ¼ 0.55, SE ¼ 0.03) on the AB
Test, t(22) ¼ 14.33, P, 0.01, d ¼ 2.56. Given the success of this
manipulation check, we turn now to the critical analyses.
Results were first analyzed by collapsing the six-point confi-
dence ratings into “old” (ratings of 4, 5, or 6) and “new” (ratings
of 1, 2, or 3) to calculate hit and false alarm rates (see below for fur-
ther analyses). Hit rates occurred when participants identified old
words as “old” and false alarms occurred when participants iden-
tified new words as “old.” Hit and false alarm rates for old items,
critical lures, and new items for the AB Test and the AC Test are
shown in Figure 3A. The AB Test results are further divided by
the proportion of items that were identified as recollected and
familiar. Hit rates were higher in the AB Test than in the AC
Test, t(34) ¼ 5.69, P, 0.01, d ¼ 1.95, indicating better memory
for the AB items. False alarms to critical lures in the AB Test and
AC Test were not directly comparable here, as in the AB Test
they represented false alarms to recombined AB pairs whereas in
the AC Test they represented false alarms to previously learned
AB items. However, false alarms to critical lures were contrasted
against false alarms rates to new items. In both the AB Test and
the AC test, false alarm rates to critical lures were greater than false
alarm rates to new items, t(34) ¼ 9.67, P, 0.01, d ¼ 3.32 and
t(34) ¼ 6.74, P, 0.01, d ¼ 2.31, respectively. Overall however,
the more important question was whether the hit rates and false
alarms to critical lures in the AC Test varied depending on wheth-
er the corresponding AB item was recollected or familiar.
Hit rates and false alarms to critical lures during the AC Test,
conditionalized on whether the corresponding AB items were
recollected or familiar during the AB Test, are shown in Figure
3B. False alarms to new items are shown for comparison purposes.
Interestingly, although false alarms to critical lures were more fre-
quent for AC|F versus AC|R items, t(34) ¼ 2.64, P, 0.05, d ¼ 0.91,
Figure 2. (A) Mean proportion of old items and critical lures recalled (i.e., produced and identified as
recollected or familiar) during the test in Experiment 2. Results of the AB recall are further divided to
illustrate the proportion of recollection [p(R)] and familiarity [p(K)] responses. (B) Mean proportion
of old items and critical lures recalled during the test conditionalized by whether the corresponding
AB item was recollection (AC|R) or familiar (AC|F). In both panels, old items indicate AB pairs for the
AB portion of the test and AC pairs for the AC portion of the test, whereas critical lures indicate AC
pairs for the AB portion of the test and AB pairs for the AC portion of the test. Error bars represent stan-
dard errors of the mean.
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there was no difference in hit rates between AC|F and AC|R items,
t(34) ¼ 0.99, P ¼ 0.33, d ¼ 0.34. Using AB Test hit rates as a base-
line, both AC|R and AC|F hit rates were facilitated above baseline,
both t’s . 4.35, P, 0.01, d. 1.49. This finding suggests that AC
learning is technically facilitated for both AC|R and AC|F items,
but the AC representations that are formed are less susceptible
to AB interference for AC|R items compared with AC|F items.4
We will consider the implications of this finding in more detail
in the discussion. For now,we continue our analyses by investigat-
ing the potential influence of strength. Is it the case that the dif-
ferences between the AC|R and AC|F conditions could have been
due to a difference in strength?
Our preceding analyses were carried out by classifying “old”
responses as ratings of 4, 5, or 6 on the six-point confidence scale
during the AB and AC Tests. To examine the influence of confi-
dence, the results of the AB Test were recategorized by classifying
“old” responses as either high or low confidence.High-confidence
“old” responses included ratings of 5 and 6, whereas low confi-
dence “old” responses included ratings of 3 and 4.5 In our new
analysis, we examined hit and false alarms rates during the AC
Test, based onwhether the corresponding AB itemswere recollect-
ed or familiar at high or low levels of confidence. It should be not-
ed that no low confidence recollection responses existed and so
this category is excluded.
The results of the AC Test conditionalized by both recollec-
tion/familiarity and by high and low confidence can be seen in
Figure 4A. Importantly, false alarms to critical lures were greater
in both the low confidence and high confidence AC|F conditions
comparedwith the (high confidence) AC|R condition, t(34) ¼ 2.70,
P, 0.05, d ¼ 0.93 and t(34) ¼ 3.39, P, 0.01, d ¼ 1.16, respective-
ly. There was no difference in false alarm rates to critical lures
between the two AC|F conditions, t(34) ¼ 0.12, P ¼ 0.90, d ¼
0.04. There was similarly no difference between the hit rates of
any of the conditions, all t’s , 1.59, P . 0.12, d, 0.54. The ob-
served difference in false alarms to critical lures was not mediated
by the strength of representations, as measured by subjective
ratings of confidence. Importantly then, the AC|R condition
had the lowest false alarm rate to critical lures, independent of
the influence of memory strength.
One limitation of examining confidence ratings is that there
are typically no low confidence recollection responses, and hence,
in our data it was not possible to investigate whether low confi-
dence AC|R itemswould have a low false alarm rate to critical lures
as high confidence AC|R items did. We, therefore, present one
more analysis aimed to address the issue of strength. During the
AB Test, participants were shown AB and AB′ items. Presumably,
if a subject could recognize an AB item as old and reject an AB′
item, the representation that supports that decision must be
stronger or more specific than one that would allow them to
accept both the AB and AB′ item as old. In essence, a second
way to control for the strength of associations is to separate out
high accuracy AB items (where AB is accepted and AB′ is rejected)
from low accuracy AB items (where both AB and AB′ items are
accepted). An added benefit of using this technique is that there
were sufficient high accuracy and low accuracy AB items that
were recollected for analysis.
Performance during the AC Test, conditionalized onwhether
AB items were recollected or familiar and whether AB items were
high or low accuracy is shown in Figure 4B. False alarms to critical
lures were once again greater for AC|F versus AC|R items,
Figure 3. (A) Mean proportion of “old” responses to old items, critical lures, and new items in the AB Test and AC Test. Results of the AB Test are further
divided to illustrate the proportion of recollection [p(R)] and familiarity [p(F)] responses. (B) Mean proportion of “old” responses to old items, critical lures,
and new items in the AC Test conditionalized by whether the corresponding AB item was recollected (AC|R) or familiar (AC|F) during the AB Test. In both
panels, old items indicate AB pairs in the AB Test and AC pairs in the AC Test, critical lures indicate AB′ pairs in the AB Test and AB pairs in the AC Test, and
new items indicate AD pairs in the AB Test and AE pairs in the AC Test. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
4We note here that it may be possible that certain AB word pairs were naturally
more associable due to their nature (e.g., THE-BOOK would be a highly associ-
able pair), but also by their nature would be easily associable with a new word
(e.g., THE-TREE). As a result, is it possible that item-specific effects cause both
some AB pairs to be rated as recollected AND to subsequently form strong AC
representations (as opposed to a recollected AB pair being the primary cause of
the benefit to AC representation)? Though this possibility cannot be ruled out
definitively, a supplementary item-analysis was carried out on the data in
Experiment 3. In that analysis, we analyzed 415 unique AB word pairs that
had been given RKN ratings by at least five different subjects each. We found
that only eight of the word pairs were being rated as “recollected” more
often than would be expected by chance. In contrast, 16 of the word pairs
were rated as “familiar” more often than would be expected by chance, and
20 were rated as “new” more often than would be expected by chance.
Dropping these 44 items from our reported analyses had, at best, a minute
effect on our results. Reported means and standard errors remained either un-
changed or shifted by very small margins (e.g., a mean of 0.64 might have
shifted to 0.65 or 0.63, though most means did not). Overall, these supple-
mentary analyses suggest that there were not many AB word pairs that could
be considered especially recollectable in general, and furthermore these
items did not influence the data patterns that we observed.
5Note that although ratings of “3” technically indicated a “new” response, it
was the least certain “new” response. That is, a rating of “3” indicates that
the subject believes the item might be new, as opposed to a rating of “1”
which indicates a subject being certain an item is “new.” The logic of treating
“3” responses as a low confidence “old” responses comes from receiver oper-
ating characteristic (ROC) curve research, which interprets confidence respons-
es as hits and false alarms across varying levels of criteria. For example, in ROC
research, it is common to create hits and false alarms that include confidence
responses from “2” to “6” together indicating a subject’s more lenient (theo-
retical) criterion for a hit or false alarm. It should also be noted that none of
the reported patterns depend on the inclusion of “3” ratings, and that includ-
ing both “3” and “4” together to indicate weak hits only serves to produce
more reliable estimates across subjects.
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regardless of strength. Namely, for low accuracy items, false
alarms to critical lures were greater for AC|F versus AC|R items,
t(34)¼ 3.44, P, 0.01, d ¼ 1.18, and that was true as well for high
accuracy items, t(34) ¼ 3.78, P, 0.01, d ¼ 1.30. There was no dif-
ference between false alarms to critical lures for high and low ac-
curacy AC|F items, t(34) ¼ 0.19, P ¼ 0.85, d ¼ 0.07, nor for high
and low accuracy AC|R items, t(34) ¼ 1.13, P ¼ 0.29, d ¼ 0.39.
Interestingly, high versus low accuracy did influence hit rates,
but this difference was only significant between high-confidence
and low-confidence AC|R items, t(34) ¼ 10.12, P, 0.01, d ¼ 3.47.
All other comparisons between hit rates were marginal at best,
all t’s,1.81, P. 0.07, d , 0.62. Although this finding provides
somemodest evidence that stronger AB representationsmay facil-
itate the acquisition of AC items, this finding was found within
the AC|R items. That is, there was no evidence that strength influ-
enced AC|F items. Given that strength often varies for familiar
items whereas recollected items are typically always quite strong,
this finding should quell any concerns that the preceding differ-
ences between AC|R and AC|F conditions could have been ex-
plained by strength. If anything, strength may play a small role
in enhancing the effects observed for AC|R items, but not AC|F
items.
The goal of Experiment 3 was to confirm and extend the
results of Experiments 1 and 2, using a recognition paradigm. In
Experiments 1 and 2, it was found that if an AB item were recol-
lected, it was subsequently easier to learn the corresponding AC
item. At the final test, this effect manifested as an increased recall
of AC and a decreased likelihood of an AB intrusion. The results of
Experiment 3 generally support Experiments 1 and 2, while sug-
gesting that AC learning may be facilitated for both AC|R and
AC|F items, but the AC representations that are formed are less
susceptible to AB interference for AC|R items compared with
AC|F items. This issue is discussedmore in theGeneral Discussion.
As a final point, a criticmight argue that in Experiment 3 par-
ticipants may have relied heavily on strategic rejection, which
could account for the data pattern observed. For example, during
the AC Test if a participant is sure that they studied AC, they can
identify that AC item as studied and reject all other items as
“new,” without evaluating them much. Although we cannot
rule out this possibility definitively, if participants were using
such a strategy, we might expect that the confidence with which
they can identify items would influence their false alarm rates.
Namely, when participants are very sure of their memory for
AC, they could accept AC and reject all others, but when they
are less sure they cannot categorically reject all non-AC items,
and hence, false alarms should increase. We saw no such rise in
intrusions linked to confidence in our data, suggesting that this
type of strategy was not playing a large role in our results. As
well, Experiment 3 replicated the findings of Experiments 1 and
2, which used a completely different procedure, lending further
support to the idea that the results of Experiment 3 were depen-
dent primarily on recollection and familiarity, rather than other
idiosyncrasies related to its design.
General discussion
Neuropsychological evidence suggests that hippocampal memo-
ries are more flexible than extra-hippocampal memories, but
the implications of this idea are only beginning to be explored.
In the present study, we investigated the novel hypothesis that
recollection-based and familiarity-based associative memories,
by being differentially supported by the hippocampus, should
contribute differently to the formation of newassociations in neu-
rologically intact individuals. Althoughwe reviewed some patient
findings which are consistent with this hypothesis (Winocur and
Weiskrantz 1976;Winocur and Kinsbourne 1978; Kinsbourne and
Winocur 1980; Winocur et al. 1996; Hay et al. 2002), it has never
been tested directly. Across three experiments, using the AB/AC
learning paradigm, we found converging evidence that AC learn-
ing was facilitated above baseline when AB pairs were recollected.
In recall conditions, AC learning was less affected when AB pairs
were familiar, although using a more sensitive recognition para-
digm we showed that AC learning may indeed be facilitated
when AB pairs are familiar. However, the manner in which recol-
lected and familiarity-based representations support AC learning
is fundamentally different: B-item false memories (intrusions and
false alarms) during the AC test were greater when AB pairs were
familiar when compared with when they were recollected. Thus,
recollection-based memories not only support the formation of
new associations but do so in a manner that, compared with
familiarity-based memories, minimizes interference, regardless of
the strength of the recollection-based or familiarity-basedmemory.
Regarding Experiment 3 specifically, when AB representa-
tions are recollected, they supported the acquisition of AC items.
This was shown by an increased hit rate to AC items above base-
line, and a decreased false alarm rate to AB items compared with
when AB representations were familiar. AC learning, however,
was also supported when AB representations were familiar, with
hit rates to AC items being above baseline, suggesting learning
was facilitated. However, false alarms to AB items during the AC
Test were higher when AB representations were familiarity-based,
than when they were recollected. Together, these results
suggest that recollected AB representations support AC learning
by facilitating the acquisition of AC items in away that simultane-
ously reduces interference with existing AB representations.
Figure 4. (A) Mean proportion of “old” responses to old items, critical lures, and new items in the AC Test conditionalized by whether the correspond-
ing AB item was high confidence recollected, high confidence familiar, or low confidence familiar during the AB Test. (B) Mean proportion of “old” re-
sponses to old items, critical lures, and new items in the AC Test conditionalized by whether the corresponding AB itemwas high accuracy recollected, low
accuracy recollected, high accuracy familiar, or low accuracy familiar during the AB Test. In both panels, old items indicate AC pairs in the AC Test, critical
lures indicate AB pairs in the AC Test, and new items indicate AE pairs in the AC Test. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
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Familiarity-based AB representations also seem to support AC
learning by facilitating the acquisition of AC items to a degree,
but the AC representations that are formed are not independent
of the previously acquired AB representations. In essence, a
familiarity-based AB representation can facilitate AC learning,
but it does so in such amanner that theAB andAC representations
are overlapping and interfere with one another during the AC
Test. In recall tasks such as in Experiment 1 and 2, because
both AC and AB are competing for retrieval during the AC Test,
we would have expected recall rates for AC items to be suppressed
by the occasional intrusion of AB items. That is why there was
no facilitative effect in recall rates for AC|F items in Experiments
1 and 2.
Overall, Experiment 3 shows effects that were similar and
consistent to those observed in Experiments 1 and 2 on cued re-
call, affirming our supposition that familiarity, as measured in
a cued recall paradigm, would be analogous to that observed in
recognition. As well, using two techniques to address the issue
of strength, we found little evidence that strength was the driving
force behind our observed effects. Instead, the differences that
arose were dependent on recollection and familiarity. Although
both recollective and familiarity-based representations may
support AC learning to a degree, recollective representations do
so in a manner that minimizes interference in comparison to
familiarity-based representations.
Neuropsychological implications
The present findings connect with emerging work which demon-
strates that hippocampally dependent representations, which
presumably are recollective, support the flexible use of existing
relational associations to draw inferences (Myers et al. 2003;
Eichenbaum et al. 2007; van der Jeugd et al. 2009; Olsen
et al. 2012; Zeithamova et al. 2012; Moscovitch et al. 2016).
Specifically, the present work shows that recollective representa-
tions are flexible in that the individual elements that comprise
the representation can be selectively reassociated during later
learning. This principle may underlie the operations implicated
in performing some tests of inferential reasoning. For example,
in an fMRI study, Preston et al. (2004) demonstrated that although
the posterior hippocampus was activated in response to the
retrieval of learned associations, the anterior hippocampus was
activated bilaterally when participants were asked to make judg-
ments that required inferences across learned associations (see
also Heckers et al. 2004; Zalesak and Heckers 2009). Likewise,
Shohamy andWagner (2009) found that successful generalization
from overlapping learned associations to new ones, depends on
hippocampal processes involved in integrating the information
from learned associations at encoding. In a subsequent study,
Foerde et al. (2013) showed that similar, hippocampally depen-
dent processes were operating in transferring the value of one
item, to a second item with which it was experimentally associat-
ed. Underlying these, and similar phenomena (for reviews, see
Olsen et al. 2012; Zeithamova et al. 2012), is the finding that
the hippocampus supports flexible combination or recombina-
tion of elements in existing associations to formnew associations.
If we accept that recollective/hippocampal representations
are flexible, one could ask why familiarity-based representations
are not. One suggestion is that they are unitized, a process where-
by paired elements, such as the words FIRE and DOG, are repre-
sented as a single indivisible unit, FIREDOG (Laberge and
Samuels 1974; Graf and Schacter 1989; Giovanello et al. 2006;
Quamme et al. 2007). Quamme et al. (2007) noted that, whereas
relational associations are believed to rely on hippocampal repre-
sentation, unitized associations may be akin to individual items
and dependent on areas that represent familiarity, such as the
perirhinal cortex (Aggleton and Brown 1999; Yonelinas 2002;
Bowles et al. 2007; Mayes et al. 2007). To test this hypothesis,
Quamme et al. had patients with hippocampal damage and clear
recollective deficits learn pairs of words under either associative
encoding conditions (i.e., two words were presented in a sen-
tence) or unitized encoding conditions (i.e., two words were pre-
sented as a compound word with a definition for that compound
word below). As expected, the patients showed typical associative
memory impairments whenword pairs were learned under associ-
ative encoding conditions, but not whenword pairs were unitized
at encoding. In related work, researchers have used ERPs (Rhodes
and Donaldson 2007; Diana et al. 2011) and receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curves (Diana et al. 2008) to demonstrate
that familiarity can support associative source judgments when
source and item-information is unitized. Thus, the unitization
of associations allowed individuals to represent associations
with familiarity, instead of recollection (see also Yonelinas et al.
1999; Giovanello et al. 2006; Bastin et al. 2010; Tibon et al. 2012).
Although unitization is beneficial in some circumstances,
inasmuch as it may help individuals form associative representa-
tions using familiarity-based processes, a drawback to unitization
is that itmay be difficult to re-formor change associations. That is,
in contrast to recollection-based memories which may code indi-
vidual elements and the associations between elements, unitized
representations seem to integrate elements and their associations
into a gestalt or indivisible entity. Consistent with this account,
research has shown that unitizing items can lead to a memory
benefit for the combined pair (i.e., the association), while at the
same time impair memory for the individual items themselves
(i.e., item-memory; Pilgrim et al. 2012; Murray and Kensinger
2013). If those elements or associations need to be changed at
a later time, it may be difficult either to effect such a change in
unitized representations, or to access the representations of the in-
dividual items to be used as a component in a new association.
Therefore, individuals may be more susceptible to interference
from the previously encoded unitized association, because of
the difficulty in separating the elements from the previous associ-
ation to form an independent, novel association with some of
the elements. As a result, given an element of the new association
as a cue, participants would bemore likely to intrude the previous
(unitized) association, as we observed in our experiments. In sum,
the current results are consistent with the notion that familiarity-
based associations may sometimes be unitized, and when this
occurs, the unitized associations offer less benefit to later learning
of novel, overlapping information, because they may act to com-
pete at a final test, and increase false memories.
Conclusion
In three experiments we have shown that recollective associative
memories demonstrate more flexibility than familiarity-based
associative memories. Participants appeared to use elements
from recollective associative memories to facilitate the formation
of new associative memories more easily than elements from
familiarity-based associative memories. Assuming that recollec-
tion is supported by the hippocampus whereas familiarity,
typically, is not, these findings are consistent with neuropsycho-
logical evidence that shows hippocampal representations are
more flexible than extra-hippocampal representations (Cohen
and Eichenbaum 1993; Eichenbaum et al. 2007; Schacter et al.
2012). These results also fit with cognitive accounts that suggest
the elements of recollection are discretely coded and bound
together in such a manner that the elements can easily be
individually accessed for later learning (Cohen and Eichenbaum
1993; O’Reilly and Rudy 2001), whereas familiarity-based
traces are less flexible (Olsen et al. 2012; Zeithamova et al.
Flexibility of recollection and familiarity
www.learnmem.org 305 Learning & Memory
 Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press on July 15, 2019 - Published by learnmem.cshlp.orgDownloaded from 
2012), possibly because they are unitized , making it difficult to
extract individual elements for reuse (Giovanello et al. 2006;




Participants. Thirty-nine undergraduate students from the
University of Toronto Scarborough, completed Experiment 1 on-
line in exchange for course credit. Four participants produced
either no recollection or familiarity responses during the AB
Test. Because AC Test results would be binned by recollection
and familiarity responses during the AB Test, these participants
were dropped. Thus, a total of 35 participants were included in
the analyses. All recruitment and testing followed the appropriate
ethical guidelines for the University of Toronto.
Materials.Aword pool of 155 cue-target sets was created from
the free association norms of Nelson et al. (2004). This pool
consisted of sets of three words: one cue and two related targets.
The mean probability that a cue would give rise to a target was
0.52 (SD ¼ 0.15). For each participant, 40 cue-target sets were
randomly selected to be used. In all cases, the cue was designed
to be the A-word. In half the cases the stronger associate of the
cue was designated to be the B-word and the weaker associate of
the cue was designated to be the C-word. In the other cases,
B-words were the weaker associate of the cue and C-words were
the stronger associate.
Finally, a pool of 543 additional cues was selected from the
free association norms of Nelson et al. (2004). These cues were
unrelated to each other and to any of the 155 cue-target sets
that were previously selected. Thus, these 543 words served as a
random list of unrelatedwords. For each participant, 40 cue-target
sets were randomly created from this pool of 543 words. Each
cue-target set was created by randomly selecting oneword to serve
as the cue (or A-word), and two other words to serve as the targets
(or B- and C-words).
Past work has demonstrated that related word pairs are
better represented by familiarity than are unrelated word pairs
(Giovanello et al. 2006; Greve et al. 2007, 2011). Additionally,
words that are deeply processed rely on recollection more so
than words that are shallowly processed (see Craik and Lockhart
1972). By having related and unrelated word pairs, some of which
will be processed deeply and others shallowly (see Procedure
below), our goal was to ensure a distribution of recollection and
familiarity-based memory for the pairs in our experiment. Initial
analyses of the AB test data confirm that these manipulations
had effects consistent with the past literature: Overall familiarity,
as measured using the independent remember-know procedure
(see Yonelinas and Jacoby 1995; Jacoby et al. 1997; Ochsner
2000; Mangels et al. 2001)),6 was greater for related word pairs
(M ¼ 0.29, SE ¼ 0.05) than for unrelated word pairs (M ¼ 0.15,
SE ¼ 0.04), t(29) ¼ 5.02, P, 0.01, d ¼ 0.65, and deeply encoded
words showed a greater proportion of recollection responses
(M ¼ 0.47, SE ¼ 0.04) than did shallowly encoded words (M ¼
0.21, SE ¼ 0.03), t(29) ¼ 8.74, P, 0.01, d ¼ 1.47.
Procedure. Experiment 1 consisted of four phases: Study 1 (AB
Study), Test 1 (AB Test), Study 2 (AC Study), and Test 2 (AC Test).
These four phases were run four times per participant. That is,
after completing the first AC Test, participants began again with
a new AB Study through to a new AC Test. This was repeated until
four full runs of the phases had been completed.
During each run, 10 of the 40 related cue-target sets and 10
of the 40 unrelated cue-target sets were selected to be used as
stimuli. Thus, in Study 1, participants studied 20 AB word pairs,
10 of which were related and 10 of which were unrelated. The or-
der of word pairs was randomized at the beginning of each phase.
Cue-target sets never repeated between runs so that all 40 related
and 40 unrelated cue-target sets for each participant were used by
the end of the experiment.
During AB Study, AB word pairs were presented individually
on the screen. For each word pair, participants either had to
indicate which of the two words had more vowels, or whether
the words were related. When judging vowels, participants could
indicate either “the left word,” “equal,” or “the right word.”
When judging whether twowords were related participants could
indicate that thewordswere “not related,” “somewhat related,” or
“very related.” These tasks acted as shallow and deep encoding
manipulations, respectively (see Craik and Lockhart 1972), to
ensure there would be enough encoding variability to yield both
recollection-based and familiarity-basedword pairs. In both cases,
participants made their selections by clicking on an option with
the mouse and then clicking a NEXT button to proceed to the
next trial. There was a 500-ms inter-stimulus interval between
trials.
During the AB Test participants were shownA-words individ-
ually on the screen and had to recall the corresponding B-word.
Participants were told to guess if no word came to mind. After
typing in their response, participants were asked why they chose
that particular response, and could indicate that they recollected
the word, the word was familiar, or they were simply guessing. To
ensure the accuracy of recollection and familiarity responses and
to ensure they were not confounded with confidence, a detailed
set of instructions explaining the difference between recollection
and familiarity and confidence were developed for our experi-
ment. In our experiment, “reexperience” and “familiar” were
selected as labels for recollection and familiarity in lieu of “re-
member” and “know.” Piloting showed that “reexperience” and
“familiar” were more intuitive for participants, and better fit
with the descriptions of recollection and familiarity.
Because our experiment was conducted online, in-laboratory
piloting was used to confirm that participants understood the
written recollection/familiarity instructions independently,
without interaction with a researcher. Strict instructions were
provided, to ensure that participants did not confuse these con-
cepts with confidence. Participants were also warned that at the
end of the experiment they may be prompted with some items
that they said they recollected and asked to justify their responses
by explaining what specifically they had recollected.
During AC Study, AC word pairs were presented individually
on the screen. 4500 msec after a pair was presented, a NEXT
button appeared and participants could click it with the mouse
to proceed. Participants were instructed to study the AC word
pairs for a later memory test. No specific encoding instructions
were given for the AC Study phase. There was a 500-msec inter-
stimulus interval between trials.
Finally, during AC Test, memory for the AC associations was
tested. On each trial, an A-word was shown. Participants were first
asked to recall the C-word that corresponded to this A-word, from
the study phase. Participants typed in their response and pressed
ENTER to proceed. Participants were instructed to guess if they
could not recall the C-word, but not to produce B-words.
Experiment 2
Method
Participants. Thirty-eight participants from the same pool as
Experiment 1 participated in Experiment 2. Eight participants
produced either no recollection or no familiarity responses and
were dropped. Thus, a total of 30 participants were included in
the analyses.
Materials. The same materials were used as in Experiment 1.
Procedure. The procedure of Experiment 2 was identical to
that of Experiment 1 except that instead of a two test phases there
6When comparing overall levels of familiarity between conditions, examining
raw “know” responses would be misleading as the proportion of items recog-
nized and “remembered” differed between these two conditions. Because of
these circumstances, the independent remember-know procedure was
adopted to allow for a more unbiased comparison of the overall levels of famil-
iarity of the two stimuli sets.
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was only one. Thus, the three phases of Experiment 2were Study 1
(AB Study), Study 2 (AC Study), and Test. The Test phase was a ver-
sion of MMFR. On each test trial, participants were given an
A-word cue and asked to recall the corresponding C-word first.
Afterward, participants were asked to recall the corresponding
B-word and then to indicate how they recalled the B-word by in-
dicating recollection, familiarity, or guess. Thus, although there
was a single test phase, AB and AC memory were still probed dur-
ing this test. For consistency with Experiment 1, we will still refer
to the AB Test and AC Test results.
Experiment 3
Method
Participants. Thirty-eight participants from the same pool as
Experiments 1 and 2 participated in Experiment 3. Three partici-
pants produced either no recollection or familiarity responses
during the AB Test and were dropped. Thus, a total of 35 partici-
pants were included in the analyses.
Materials. A word pool of 1236 nouns was selected from the
MRC Linguistic Database (Wilson 1988). Words were between 5
and 10 letters long (M ¼ 6.82, SD ¼ 1.57) and had a Kucera–
Francis word frequency (Kucera and Francis 1967) between 20
and 395 (M ¼ 70.76, SD ¼ 64.03). For each participant, 600 words
were randomly selected from this pool. Thesewordswere random-
ly divided into sets of 120 A-words, B-words, C-words, D-words,
and E-words. From these subsets 120 AB, 60 AC, 60 AD, and 60
AE pairs were arranged.
Procedure. The procedure of Experiment 3 was similar to
Experiment 1 except that participants were testedwith yes/no rec-
ognition instead of cued recall. Furthermore, the experiment was
not broken up into runs because performance on recognition was
expected to be good even for a large study list. Thus, Experiment 3
consisted of four phases: Study 1 (AB Study), Test 1 (AB Test),
Study 2 (AC Study), and Test 2 (AC Test). For illustrative purposes,
the different phases and types of stimuli in Experiment 3 are
presented in 3.
During the AB Study phase participants studied 120 AB
word pairs, which were presented individually for 4000 msec
with a 1000-msec inter-stimulus interval. Unlike the previous
experiments, participants were given no specific encoding
instructions. During the AB Test phase, participants saw 60
studied AB pairs mixed in with 120 new pairs. Half the new
pairs were AB’ items, such that the B-item in the pair was
taken from another pair that had been studied but was not tested
(i.e., the A- and B-words appeared in the study list but not
together).7 The remaining new items were AD items, such that
the A-word had been studied but the D-word was completely
novel.
The order of the test list was randomized except that AB,
AB’, and AD pairs were grouped together by A-word. Thus,
for example, if the AB, AB’, and AD pairs were CASTLE-MAN,
CASTLE-CUP, and CASTLE-DESK, respectively (see Fig. 5), these
three word pairs would appear sequentially in the test list. The
order of which pair would appear first, second, and third was
randomized, as was the location of the triad in the overall test
list, but all words sharing the same A-word appeared together.
This grouping by A-word was done to prevent subsequent memo-
ry effects from arising asmight occur if a participant was tested on
the AD pair or AB’ pair early in the test list which then interfered
with original memory for the AB pair which would be tested later
in the list. To ensure that ratings of AB, AB′, and AD pairs were as
independent as possible, participants were given detailed instruc-
tions about the need to evaluate each pair separately, and they
were specifically told that they could conceivably rate all pairs
as studied or all pairs as new if their feelings or memories support-
ed such claims. That is, participants were told not to rely on
strategies of disregarding other items of an A-set once they had
spotted an item they thought was studied, and instead to contin-
ue to evaluate each item on its own merit.
On each test trial a word pair was presented to participants
and they had to judge whether the pair had been studied or was
new. Participants made their response on a six-point confidence
scale from 6 (sure studied) to 1 (sure new). After making their
decision, participants indicated the subjective state of memory
on which their recognition decision was based. Here, participants
could indicate recollection, familiarity, or guess.
After the AB Test, participants engaged in the AC Study
phase. Here, AC word pairs were shown individually for 4000
msec with a 1000-msec inter-stimulus interval. Participants stud-
ied 60 ACword pairs which corresponded to the 60 intact AB pairs
that were tested in the AB Test (see Fig. 5). Once again, partici-
pants were given no specific encoding instruction for these
items. During the AC Test, participants saw the 60 studied AC
pairs inter-mixed with 120 new pairs. Half of the new pairs were
AB items from the AB study and test phase. The remaining new
Figure 5. Illustration of the AB Study and Test phases (A) and the AC Study and Test phases (B) in Experiment 3. During the AB Study phase, participants
study pairs of words identified as AB pairs. Afterward, some AB pairs are recombined to form AB′ items. During the AB Test, participants are shown triads of
AB, AB′, and AD (new) items and must rate confidence and make recollection/familiarity judgments for each item. During the AC Study phase A items are
recombined with novel words to form AC pairs. During the AC Test phase participants are shown triads of AC, AB, and AE (new) items. Hit rates in the AC
Test therefore reflect the ability to learn AC items whereas false alarms to critical lures in the AC Test reflect the tendency of previously learned items (i.e.,
AB items) to interfere during AC retrieval.
7The inclusion of AB′ items was to ensure that participants would need to rely
on the associativememory of the AB items when recognizing items andmaking
their R/K judgments. Without AB′ items, participants could presumably just
rely on item-recognition (i.e., B versus D items) and ignore the associative
information.
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pairs were AE pairs (i.e., familiar A-words paired with completely
new E-words). Participants provided confidence ratings and recol-
lection/familiarity responses during the AC Test, in the same
manner as in the AB Test. As well, although the order of the
test list was randomized, AC, AB, and AE pairs were grouped by
A-words as in the AB Test.8
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